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Feb 17, 2026
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在慕尼黑安全会议上，领导人们一致认为1945年后的世界秩序已经崩溃，进入了大国政治的新阶段。文章探讨了国际关系中的权力动态，强调大国之间的冲突主要表现为贸易战、科技战、地缘政治战、资本战和军事战。有效的国际治理需要强大的经济和军事力量，而当前的国际秩序更倾向于丛林法则。作者指出，冲突往往源于强国的衰落或新兴强国的崛起，强调在谈判中寻求双赢的结果比战争更为理智。
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思想政治
Ray Dalio
At the Munich Security Conference, the post-1945 world order was pronounced dead by most leaders and the picture behind it was laid out in the Security Report 2026, entitled “Under Destruction,” which you can read here if you're interested. More specifically, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said, “The world order as it has stood for decades no longer exists,” and that we are in a period “great power politics.” He made clear that freedom “is no longer a given” in this new era. French President Emmanuel Macron echoed Merz’s assessment and said that Europe’s old security structures tied to the previous world order don't exist and that Europe must prepare for war. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that we are in a “new geopolitics era” because the “old world” is gone.
今年的慕尼黑安全会议上，大多数国家领导人都宣告，1945年建立的战后世界秩序，已正式成为过去式，会议发布的《2026年安全报告》深入地阐述了这个图景，报告题目非常应景，《大厦将倾》（Under Desctruction），如果你有兴趣，可以在这里阅读全文。具体的例子有很多，德国总理默茨说，“过去几十年的世界秩序已不复存在”，我们正式进入“大国政治”时代。他明确表示，在这个新时代，自由“不再是理所当然的前提”。法国总统马克龙与默茨的观点不谋而合，他说，欧洲旧的安全结构的基础就是旧的世界秩序，现在已不复存在，欧洲必须为战争做好准备。美国国务卿鲁比奥表示，我们正处于“新地缘政治时代”，因为“旧世界”已经结束了。
In my parlance, we are in the Stage 6 part of the Big Cycle in which there is great disorder arising from being in a period in which there are no rules, might is right, and there is a clash of great powers. How Stage 6 works is explained in detail in Chapter 6, “The Big Cycle of External Order and Disorder,” in my book Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order. While I previously shared a lengthy set of excerpts from Chapter 5 ("The Big Cycle of Internal Order and Disorder"), so you could see how what is going on with the United States tracks the classic cycle explained in that chapter, I am including all of Chapter 6 here for your review. Given the now nearly universal agreement that the post-1945 world order has broken down and that we are entering a new world order, I think it would be worth your time to read.
用我的话说，我们所处的时代，是世界大周期的第六阶段，这个阶段的特点是极度混乱，没有规则，强权即真理；这是大国冲突的时代。第六阶段的规律逻辑，我在《原则：应对变化中的世界秩序》的第六章“外部秩序与混乱大周期”中做了详细解释。此前，我在博客里长篇摘录过第五章“内部秩序与混乱的大周期”的内容，向大家讲解了美国国内正在发生的事情，以及这些事情与第五章所讲的经典周期正好吻合。这一篇博客，我会附上第六章的全部内容。鉴于几乎所有人都一致认同1945年战后世界秩序已经崩溃，我们正在进入新的世界秩序，我认为，这一章的内容值得大家花时间阅读。
Relationships between people and the orders that govern them work in basically the same ways, whether they are internal or external, and they blend together. In fact, it wasn’t long ago that there were no distinctions between internal and external orders because there were no clearly defined and mutually recognized boundaries between countries. For that reason, the six-stage cycle of going between order and disorder that I described in the last chapter about what happens within countries works the same way between countries, with one big exception: international relations are driven much more by raw power dynamics. That is because all governance systems require effective and agreed-upon 1) laws and law-making abilities, 2) law enforcement capabilities (e.g., police), 3) ways of adjudicating (e.g., judges), and 4) clear and specified consequences that both suit crimes and are enforced (e.g., fines and incarcerations), and those things either don’t exist or are not as effective in guiding relations between countries as they are in guiding relations within them.
人与人之间的关系，以及人际关系所遵守的秩序，无论是内部秩序还是外部秩序，运作方式基本一致，而且内外部经常相互交织。其实，内外部秩序分明的历史并不久远。以前，内部和外部秩序之间并没有明确的界限，因为当时国与国之间并没有清晰勘定、相互承认的边界线。也正因此，第5章里，每个国家由治及乱循环往复的的（兴、治、盛、奢、衰、乱）六阶段兴亡周期，同样适用于国与国之间的国际关系，只有一个因素需要特别区分：国际关系中，纯粹的实力对比，能发挥更大的作用。这是因为，一国之内，所有的治理体系都需要有效实施且广泛认可的 1）法律法规和立法能力，2）执法能力（如警察），3）司法能力（如法官），以及4）有法必依、违法必究的后果，这些后果既要与罪行相称，又要得到执行（如罚款和徒刑）。然而，在国与国之间，要么没有这些要素，要么有也不像在一国之内那样落实有效。
While attempts have been made to make the external order more rule-abiding (e.g., via the League of Nations and the United Nations), by and large they have failed because these organizations have not had more wealth and power than the most powerful countries. When individual countries have more power than the collectives of countries, the more powerful individual countries rule. For example, if the US, China, or other countries have more power than the United Nations, then the US, China, or other countries will determine how things go rather than the United Nations. That is because power prevails, and wealth and power among equals is rarely given up without a fight.
历史上，我们也尝试过建立更尊重规则的国际秩序，比如建立了国联和联合国这样的国际组织。但都失败了，因为这些国际组织在大国面前，财富和实力都相形见绌。而一旦强国的实力超过国际组织里的其他国家，那么拥有话事权的就必然是强国了。比如，假设美国、中国或别的什么国家，实力比联合国诸国都强，那么主导事态走向的就是美国、中国或别的那些强国，而不是联合国。毕竟，“强权即公理”，而在势均力敌的对手之间，不经历一场较量，财富和权力不会轻易易手。
When powerful countries have disputes, they don’t get their lawyers to plead their cases to judges. Instead, they threaten each other and either reach agreements or fight. The international order follows the law of the jungle much more than it follows international law.
如果强国之间有分歧龃龉，它们当然不会请律师找法官打官司；而是相互威胁，要么达成协议，要么兵戎相见。国际秩序更遵循丛林法则，而非国际法。
There are five major kinds of fights between countries: trade/economic wars, technology wars, capital wars, geopolitical wars, and military wars. Let’s begin by briefly defining them.
国与国之间的较量，主要有五种方式：贸易/经济战、科技战、资本战、地缘政治战和军事热战。我们先简单定义一下这几种战争。
- Trade/economic wars: Conflicts over tariffs, import/export restrictions, and other ways of damaging a rival economically
- Technology wars: Conflicts over which technologies are shared and which are held as protected aspects of national security
- Geopolitical wars: Conflicts over territory and alliances that are resolved through negotiations and explicit or implicit commitments, not fighting
- Capital wars: Conflicts imposed through financial tools such as sanctions (e.g., cutting off money and credit by punishing institutions and governments that offer it) and limiting foreign access to capital markets
- Military wars: Conflicts that involve actual shooting and the deployment of military forces
- 贸易/经济战： 包括关税战，进出口限制，使用其他经济打击手段损伤对手经济
- 科技战： 以保护国家安全为由，限制技术出口和共享
- 地缘政治战： 围绕领土和联盟而产生的冲突，通常通过谈判和公开或保密的承诺来解决，一般不会诉诸武力
- 资本战： 通过金融工具开展的斗争，手段包括制裁（如惩罚提供资金和信贷的机构和政府来切断一国的资金和信贷），以及限制外国资本进入其金融市场
- 军事热战： 正式交火，通过军事力量开展的冲突
Most fights between nations fall under one or more of those categories (cyber warfare, for example, has a role in all of them). They are over wealth and power and the ideologies pertaining to them.
大多数国与国之间的较量，都可以归入上述争战类型，有时候会发生不止一种（例如，不管发生哪种战争，几乎都会伴随网络战）。这些较量的核心，是争夺财富和权力，也是意识形态的斗争。
While most of these types of wars don’t involve shooting and killing, they all are power struggles. In most cases, the first four kinds of war will evolve over time as intense competitions between rival nations until a military war begins. These struggles and wars, whether or not they involve shooting and killing, are exertions of power of one side over the other. They can be all-out or contained, depending on how important the issue is and what the relative powers of the opponents are. But once a military war begins, all four of the other dimensions will be weaponized to the greatest extent possible.
虽然上述战争类型中，大多数没有真枪实弹的交火厮杀，但都是实力的较量。多数情况下，国与国之间的激烈竞争主要以前四种战争的形态演进，随着时间推移，斗争愈演愈烈，直到军事热战爆发。这些斗争和战争，不管有没有真刀真枪的杀伐，都是国与国之间的实力展现和过招。根据争议的重要程度和对手的相对实力，出手可以是毫无保留，也可能是点到为止。但是，一旦军事热战打响，其他四种战争手段会被极致武器化，用以强力杀伤。
As discussed in the last several chapters, all of the factors that drive internal and external cycles tend to improve and worsen together. When things get bad, there are more things to argue over, which leads to greater inclinations to fight. That’s human nature, and it is why we have the Big Cycle, which oscillates between good times and bad ones.
前几章说过，驱动内外部周期的所有因素，往往是同起同落，好时一起好，坏时一起坏。局势变差了，争议矛盾也会变多，斗争意愿也会增强。这是人性使然，也是兴衰罔替大周期的根源。
All-out wars typically occur when existential issues (ones that are so essential to the country’s existence that people are willing to fight and die for them) are at stake and they cannot be resolved by peaceful means. The wars that result from them make it clear which side gets its way and has supremacy in subsequent matters. That clarity over who sets the rules then becomes the basis of a new international order.
一般而言，只有事关国家存亡的核心利益受到威胁，而又无法通过和平手段解决的时候，才会爆发全面战争（因为国家的核心利益至关重要，国民愿意为之战斗甚至牺牲生命）。全面战争的结果，会毫无争议地明确胜利一方，胜者为王败者寇，谁胜利，谁就能制定战后世界的规则，奠定新国际秩序的基础。
The following chart shows the cycles of internal and external peace and conflict in Europe going back to 1500 as reflected in the deaths they caused. As you can see, there were three big cycles of rising and declining conflict, averaging about 150 years each. Though big civil and external wars last only a short time, they are typically the culmination of the longstanding conflicts that led up to them.
下图展示了公元1500年以来欧洲内外部和平与冲突的周期，以不同时期不同因素导致的死亡人数为指标。可以看出，五百年来，欧洲经历了三个冲突兴衰大周期，平均每个周期150年。虽然大规模内战和对外战争持续的时间较短，但它们通常是冲突长期累积后的总爆发。
While World Wars I and II were separately driven by the classic cycle, they were also interrelated.
虽然一战和二战各自有典型周期驱动的独特原因，但两次大战也相互关联。
译者图例：
这张图展示了 1400–2000 年间欧洲因冲突导致的死亡率（占总人口比例），并用 15 年移动平均平滑数据，以便更清楚地看到长期趋势。横轴是年份，纵轴是死亡率；图中蓝色代表内部冲突导致的死亡率（如内战），红色代表外部冲突导致的死亡率（如国家间战争），灰色线是两种死亡率相加的总值。
从整体形态看，欧洲的冲突死亡率呈现出典型的“长时间低位 + 少数时期剧烈爆发”结构：大多数年份的死亡率接近低基线，但在若干关键历史阶段会出现陡峭高峰。图上标注的主要峰值分别对应宗教战争与三十年战争、拿破仑战争，以及 20 世纪两次世界大战，其中世界大战阶段的峰值最高，说明那一段时间冲突对人口的杀伤强度远超其他时期。
图中同时标注了文艺复兴、启蒙运动、工业革命等相对繁荣的阶段，与战争高峰并列呈现出一种“周期性”：和平与发展往往持续较久，但矛盾可能在长期累积后以短促而猛烈的方式集中释放。二战后曲线快速回落并长期处于低位，可能是因为战后“欧洲一体化（EU integration）”制度整合与安全架构变化。
As you can see, each cycle consisted of a relatively long period of peace and prosperity (e.g., the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution) that sowed the seeds for terrible and violent external wars (e.g., the Thirty Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, and the two World Wars). Both the upswings (the periods of peace and prosperity) and the downswings (the periods of depression and war) affected the whole world. Not all countries prosper when the leading powers do because countries gain at the expense of others. For example, the decline of China from around 1840 to 1949, known as the “Century of Humiliation,” came about because the Western powers and Japan exploited China.
如图所示，每个大周期都经历一段相对漫长的和平繁荣期（比如文艺复兴、启蒙运动、工业革命时期），而和平繁荣期也为后来血腥恐怖的对外战争埋下了种子（比如三十年战争、拿破仑战争、两次世界大战）。无论是上升期（和平繁荣时期）还是下降期（萧条与战争时期），都对整个世界产生了影响。在主要强国繁荣时，并非所有国家都能共享繁荣，因为国与国之间，通常是零和游戏，我之所得，往往是他之所失。比如，中国从1840年到1949年的衰落期，被称为“百年屈辱”，就是因为西方列强和日本对中国的剥削掠夺。
As you read on, keep in mind that the two things about war that one can be most confident in are 1) that it won’t go as planned and 2) that it will be far worse than imagined. It is for those reasons that so many of the principles that follow are about ways to avoid shooting wars. Still, whether they are fought for good reasons or bad, shooting wars happen. To be clear, while I believe most are tragic and fought for nonsensical reasons, some are worth fighting because the consequences of not fighting them (e.g., the loss of freedom) would be intolerable.
读到这里，请记住，只要发生战争，就有两件事板上钉钉：第一，战争绝不会按计划发展；第二，战争的残酷程度一定会始料未及。正因如此，接下来我要讲的原则，很多都是避免真枪实弹热战的原则。然而，热战还是时不时发生，有时候是出于正当理由，有时候借口则很荒谬。有一点要说清楚，虽然我认为大多数战争都是人间悲剧，起因也往往荒唐可笑，但有些战争值得打——因为不打的话，后果不堪设想（比如会失去自由）。
As I explained in Chapter 2, after self-interest and self-survival, the quest for wealth and power is what most motivates individuals, families, companies, states, and countries. Because wealth equals power in terms of the ability to build military strength, control trade, and influence other nations, domestic and military strength go hand in hand. It takes money to buy guns (military power) and it takes money to buy butter (domestic social spending needs). When a country fails to provide adequate amounts of either, it becomes vulnerable to domestic and foreign opposition. From my study of Chinese dynasties and European empires, I’ve learned that the financial strength to outspend one’s rivals is one of the most important strengths a country can have. That is how the United States beat the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Spend enough money in the right ways, and you don’t have to have a shooting war. Long-term success depends on sustaining both the “guns” and the “butter” without producing the excesses that lead to their declines. In other words, a country must be strong enough financially to give its people both a good living standard and protection from outside enemies. The really successful countries have been able to do that for 200 to 300 years. None has been able to do it forever.
我在第二章解释过的，除了自身利益和生存之外，对财富和权力的追求是个人、家族、企业、国家最主要的驱动力。又因为财富等于权力——有了钱可以建设军事力量、控制贸易、影响他国，所以国内执政实力与军事实力是相辅相成的。买枪火弹药（建设军事力量）需要钱，买柴米油盐（满足国内社会支出需求）也需要钱。如果一个国家无法提供足够的强大军备或足够的物质幸福，这个国家在国内外反对势力面前就会变得不堪一击。通过研究中国历朝历代和欧洲各大帝国的历史，我认识到，财富雄厚。能在开支上压倒对手，是一个国家最重要的优势之一。美国就是这样在冷战中击败苏联的。只要能在对的地方花足够多的钱，就不必打热战。而一个国家长治久安的关键，就是在强大军备和物质幸福之间取得平衡，不要因为走极端而导致衰落。换句话说，一个国家必须有足够的财力，既能让人民过上好日子，又能保护人民免受外敌侵略。能将这样的强盛维持两三百年的国家，就已经是非常成功的国家了，但到现在为止，还没有哪个国家能永远保持这样的盛世。
Conflict arises when the dominant power begins to weaken or an emerging power begins to approach it in strength—or both. The greatest risk of military war is when both parties have 1) military powers that are roughly comparable and 2) irreconcilable and existential differences. As of this writing, the most potentially explosive conflict is that between the United States and China over Taiwan.
一旦既有霸权开始衰落，或新兴大国的实力逐渐逼近既有霸权，或两件事同时发生，冲突就必然出现。如果双方同时具备两个条件，爆发军事战争的风险就极大：第一，双方军事实力旗鼓相当；第二，彼此存在不可调和的生死矛盾。截至本文发表时，最有可能一触即发的军事冲突，就是中美围绕台湾问题的对抗。
The choice that opposing countries face—either fighting or backing down—is very hard to make. Both are costly—fighting in terms of lives and money, and backing down in terms of the loss of status, since it shows weakness, which leads to reduced support. When two competing entities each have the power to destroy the other, both must have extremely high trust that they won’t be unacceptably harmed or killed by the other. Managing the prisoner’s dilemma well, however, is extremely rare.
对决双方的选择不多，要么开战，要么退让，但两个选择都极其艰难。两种选择代价都很高：开战，就有人员伤亡和军费开支；退让，就是放弃影响力和地位，因为这是软弱的表现，软弱就会失去别国的支持。如果竞争的两强有相互摧毁的实力，双方必须对彼此保持极高的信任，确信对方不会对自己造成难以承受的伤害或致命威胁。然而，能妥善处理这种“囚徒困境”的情况极其罕见。
While there are no rules in international relations other than those the most powerful impose on themselves, some approaches produce better outcomes than others. Specifically, those that are more likely to lead to win-win outcomes are better than those that lead to lose-lose outcomes. Hence this all-important principle: to get more win-win outcomes one needs to negotiate with consideration given to what is most important to the other party and to oneself and know how to trade them.
虽然，国际关系中其实没有什么规则可言，只不过是实力最强的国家给自己定的规则而已，这些规则的结果也有好有坏。具体来说，那些能让双方共赢的规则，肯定比导致两败俱伤的规则好。因此，这一条原则就至关重要：要想更多地实现双赢，就需要在谈判时充分考虑对方和自己各自最看重的是什么，并懂得如何进行交易。
Skilled collaborations to produce win-win relationships that both increase and divide up wealth and power well are much more rewarding and much less painful than wars that lead to one side subjugating the other. Seeing things through your adversary’s eyes and clearly identifying and communicating your red lines to them (i.e., what cannot be compromised) are the keys to doing this well. Winning means getting the things that are most important without losing the things that are most important, so wars that cost much more in lives and money than they provide in benefits are stupid. But “stupid” wars still happen all the time for reasons that I will explain.
高明的合作共赢，既能增加双方的财富和实力，又能合理分配财富和权力，比兵戎相见要有利可图得多，也比一方成王一方败寇的痛苦小得多。只是要做到这一点，关键是要懂得站在对手的角度看问题，还要划清楚和讲清楚你的红线在哪里（也就是绝不可妥协的底线）。所谓“赢”，就是在得到最重要的利益同时，没有失去最重要的东西。所以，如果一场战争在人员伤亡和军费开支上的代价，远远超过它能带来的收益，那开战就是愚不可及。但“愚不可及”的战争还是有人在打，原因容我慢慢道来。
It is far too easy to slip into stupid wars because of a) the prisoner’s dilemma, b) a tit-for-tat escalation process, c) the perceived costs of backing down for the declining power, and d) misunderstandings existing when decision making has to be fast. Rival great powers typically find themselves in the prisoner’s dilemma; they need to have ways of assuring the other that they won’t try to kill them lest the other tries to kill them first. Tit-for-tat escalations are dangerous in that they require each side to escalate or lose what the enemy captured in the last move; it is like a game of chicken—push it too far and there is a head-on crash.
陷入愚蠢的战争实在太容易了，原因有以下几点：a) 囚徒困境，b) 针锋相对的态势升级，c) 衰落大国认为退让的代价太大，d) 在需要快速决策时发生误判。两强争霸常常陷入囚徒困境；双方都需要有途径让对方相信，自己不会动手消灭对方，不然对方就会抢先下手。针锋相对的态势升级也很危险，因为一方升级之后，另一方要么跟着升级对抗，要么就失去对方在上一轮夺走的利益；这就像“胆小鬼博弈”一样，逼得太紧，必然导致正面对抗。
Untruthful and emotional appeals that rile people up increase the dangers of stupid wars, so it is better for leaders to be truthful and thoughtful in explaining the situation and how they are dealing with it (this is especially essential in a democracy, in which the opinions of the population matter). The worst thing is when leaders are untruthful and emotional in dealing with their populations, and it is worse still when they take over the media.
用虚假言论煽动民众情绪，爆发愚蠢战争的危险会加剧，所以领导人最好实事求是、深思熟虑地向老百姓说明局势以及应对之策（在民主国家，民意至关重要，这样做尤其关键）。最糟糕的情况是，领导人在面对民众时既不诚实又情绪化，如果他们还掌控了媒体，那就更加雪上加霜了。
By and large, the tendency to move between win-win relationships and lose-lose relationships happens in a cyclical way. People and empires are more likely to have cooperative relationships during good times and to fight during bad times. When the existing great power is declining in relation to a rising power, it has a natural tendency to want to maintain the status quo or the existing rules, while the rising power wants to change them to be in line with the changing facts on the ground.
总的来说，从双赢到两败俱伤再到双赢，往往有周期规律。在形势大好时，人与人之间、国与国之间更愿意合作；而到了艰难时期，就更容易发生冲突。当既有霸权相对于新兴大国走向衰落时，既有霸权自然而然希望维持现状或推崇既有规则，而新兴大国则希望改变规则，以适应新的现实局势。
While I don’t know about the love part of the saying “all is fair in love and war,” I know the war part is right. As an example, in the American Revolutionary War, when the British lined up in rows for the fight and the American revolutionaries shot at them from behind trees, the British thought that was unfair and complained. The revolutionaries won believing the British were foolish and that the cause of independence and freedom justified changing the rules of war. That’s just how it is.
俗话说“情场如战场，为达目的，不择手段”，虽然我不太懂“情场”那部分，但“战场”这部分我很清楚，的确是不择手段。举个例子，在美国独立战争中，英军排成队列准备交战，而美国革命军躲在树后射击，英军觉得这不公平，还提出了抗议。革命军获胜，在他们看来，英军太迂腐愚蠢，为了美国独立自由的建国大业，改变交战规则算什么。战争就是这样。
This leads me to one final principle: have power, respect power, and use power wisely. Having power is good because power will win out over agreements, rules, and laws all the time. When push comes to shove, those who have the power to either enforce their interpretation of the rules and laws or to overturn them will get what they want. It is important to respect power because it’s not smart to fight a war that one is going to lose; it is preferable to negotiate the best settlement possible (that is unless one wants to be a martyr, which is usually for stupid ego reasons rather than for sensible strategic reasons). It is also important to use power wisely. Using power wisely doesn’t necessarily mean forcing others to give you what you want—i.e., bullying them. It includes the recognition that generosity and trust are powerful forces for producing win-win relationships, which are fabulously more rewarding than lose-lose relationships. In other words, it is often the case that using one’s “hard powers” is not the best path and that using one’s “soft powers” is preferable.
接下来，是最后一条原则：要有实力，尊重实力，明智地运用实力。有实力是好事，因为实力永远比协议、规则和法律更可靠。到了关键时刻，注定胜出的国家，是有实力按自己的解读执行规则和法律的国家，是有实力重新解读既有规则和法律的国家。尊重实力也很重要，因为明知必败还要开战，实在不智；还不如通过谈判达成对自己最有利的和解方案（前提是有理智的战略考量，也不排除因为愚蠢的自负，非要求死当烈士）。明智地运用实力同样重要。明智地运用实力，不是逼别人就范逆来顺受，更不是恃强凌弱。而是要知道，慷慨大度和真诚相待是实现双赢关系的强大力量。不论如何，双赢关系比两败俱伤要有价值得多。换句话说，动用“硬实力”通常并非上策，运用“软实力”才更可取。
When thinking about how to use power wisely, it’s also important to decide when to reach an agreement and when to fight. To do that, a party must imagine how its power will change over time. It is desirable to use one’s power to negotiate an agreement, enforce an agreement, or fight a war when one’s power is greatest. That means that it pays to fight early if one’s relative power is declining and fight later if it’s rising.
要明智地运用实力，还应该懂得判断什么时候该“文”（达成协议），什么时候该“武”（动手开战）。要做判断，就必须先判断自己的相对实力会随时间增强还是变弱。最有利的，是在自己实力最强时，谈判达成协议、强制执行协议或发动战争。也就是说，如果自己的相对实力在走下坡路，那就趁早开战；如果相对实力还在爬坡，那就推迟开战。
If one is in a lose-lose relationship, one has to get out of it one way or another, preferably through separation, though possibly through war. To handle one’s power wisely, it’s usually best not to show it because it will usually lead others to feel threatened and build their own threatening powers, which will lead to a mutual escalation that threatens both. Power is usually best handled like a hidden knife that can be brought out in the event of a fight. But there are times when showing one’s power and threatening to use it are most effective for improving one’s negotiating position and preventing a fight. Knowing what matters most and least to the other party, especially what they will and won’t fight for, allows you to work your way toward an equilibrium that both parties consider a fair resolution of a dispute.
如果陷入了两败俱伤的关系，就必须想办法脱身，最好脱钩，虽然很有可能难免一战。明智地运用实力，最好不要彰显实力，不然会让别国感到威胁，继而建立自己的威慑力量，导致双方相互升级对抗，最终两败俱伤。运用实力，最好像运用一把隐藏的匕首，只在真正近身开打时才亮出来。但也有时候，为了改善谈判地位、避免冲突，最好的办法就是展示实力并威胁使用武力。充分了解对方最看重什么、最不在乎什么，尤其是对方的“必救”“必战”，这样才能找到一个平衡点，双方都认为能公平地解决争端。
Though it is generally desirable to have power, it is also desirable to not have power that one doesn’t need. That is because maintaining power consumes resources, most importantly your time and your money. Also, with power comes the burden of responsibilities. I have often been struck by how much happier less powerful people can be relative to more powerful people.
有实力当然很好，但对于本来就不需要的实力，没有也挺好。因为维持实力必然消耗资源，尤其是消耗时间和金钱。而且，实力越强，责任就越大。我常常惊讶地发现，实力较弱的人和更有实力的人相比，往往更幸福。
- 作者:Neo Zed
- 链接:https://musingpages.com/politics/2026/02/17/world-order-collapse-dalio
- 声明:本文采用 CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 许可协议，转载请注明出处。
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